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ADDISON E. DEWEY*
Those who quest for the euphoria of certitude in the law may find
somewhat disconcerting certain judicial decisions referred to in this paper
and those seekers for certainty may also experience some paroxysms of
anxiety as to the continuing viability of the basic concept of freedom of
contract.' For those seeking reassurance that freedom of contract is still
regarded by the courts as a fundamental principle of Anglo-American law
reference should be made to Blount v. Smith2 where the provisions of a
partnership contract among physicians delineated the respective interests
of the contracting parties, and a partner withdrawing at his own violition
asked the court to ignore such explicit terms of the contract which provided
that no partner withdrawing for any reason other than death or permanent
total disability shall have any interest in or right to accounts receivable
representing uncollected fees for services rendered by said partner. The
court held that the parties were bound by the express contractual pro-
visions:
... in the absence of evidence of circumstances surrounding the execu-
tion, performance and termination of the contract tending at least to show
misapprehension upon the part of, and undue disadvantage imposed upon,
the party seeking to escape from such provisions, or that the penalty
claimed to be imposed upon such party bears no relationship to the loss
which may reasonably have been sustained by the other parties to the con-
tract a
In concluding its opinion the court stated:
The right to contract freely with the expectation that the contract shall
endure according to its terms is as fundamental to our society as the right
to write and to speak without restraint. Responsibility for the exercise,
however improvident, of that right is one of the roots of its preservation.
A rule of law which would sanction the renunciation of a bargain pur-
chased in freedom from illegal purpose, deception, duress, or even from
misapprehension or unequal advantage (cf. Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10
Ohio St. 2d 242) leads inexorably to individual irresponsibilify, social
instability and multifarious litigation.4
Associate Professor of Law, Capital University Law School.
'In the case of Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R., Equity 465
(1875) the concept was referred to by Sir George Jessell as follows:
... if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of con-
tracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be
held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice.
2 12 Ohio St 2d 41,231 N.E.2d 301 (1967).
8Id. at 41, 231 N.E.2d at 302.
-Id. at 47, 231 N.E.2d at 305.
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That a court will permit the parties to a contract to establish their own
contractional destinies is also made evident by a decision of the Supreme
Court of Utah in which it was concluded:
People should be entitled to contract on their own terms without indul-
gence of paternalism by courts in alleviation of one side or another from
the effects of a bad bargain.8
The holding of the case was that purchasers of real property were not
entitled to recover money paid under a real estate contract where the
amount of such payments retained by the seller as liquidated damages
as provided by the contract was 9 % of the purchase price.
While stating the doctrine of freedom of contract with his classic rhet-
oric, Mr. Justice Holmes may have presaged things to come when he said:
... Courts are less and less disposed to interfere with parties making such
contracts as they choose, so long as they interfere with no one's welfare
but their own .... It will be understood that we are speaking of parties
standing in an equal position where neither has any oppressive advantage
or power... (Emphasis supplied.) 8
Another representative expression of the freedom of contract concept
is the following ruling in Ullmann v. May.'
Courts do not relieve a party competent to contract from an improvident
agreement in the absence of fraud or bad faith.8
In exploring freedom of contract and judicial limitations thereon it
is deemed unnecessary to do more than merely note as did the court in
Ulmann v. May9 that such defenses as fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
mistake, and illegality have always been recognized by the courts to prevent
the enforcement of a contract."0 Consideration will not be given to con-
tracts made voidable by fraudulent acts, the type of which have been de-
scribed as "conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest.""
Extended attention will likewise not be given to the established con-
tract principle which is often stated as a general rule that one is bound
by what one signs.'2 This concept is only a general rule because various
r Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272,332 P.2d 989 (1958).
0 Daley v. People's Building, Loan & Savings Ass'n., 178 Mass. 13, 19-20; 59 N.E. 452, 453
(1901).
7 147 Ohio St. 468, 72 N.E.2d 63 (1947).
8 Id. at 468, 72 N.E.2d at 64.
0 Id. at 476, 72 N.E.2d at 68.
10 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1425 (3d ed. 1968).
". United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951); see Havas v. Alger 461, p.2d 857
(1969) where seller of automobiles was denied recovery from buyer because of fraudulent mis-
representations by the seller that an automobile was a 1960 model when in fact it was a 1959
model.
12 The original RESrATEMENT OF CONTRACrS, § 70 (1932) states this proposition as fol-
lows:
One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who manifests acceptance of the
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court decisions reviewed in this article clearly indicate that a defendant
may not always be bound by a writing which he signed."3 In shifting the
cynosure of attention from the strict and traditional application of freedom
of contract to various cases where the courts have held that the concept
was inapplicable under particular facts, it is appropriate to note the follow-
ing observation in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.1" by Justice
Francis speaking for a court which has not been characterized by judicial
diffidence. In the Henningsen case, which is a focal point in judicial de-
velopment of the doctrine of refusing to enforce unconscionable contracts
or portions thereof, the court held unenforceable a disclaimer of liability
for breach of warranty by an automobile manufacturer and dealer. At one
portion of the opinion Justice Francis said:
In assessing its [the disdaimer's] significance we must keep in mind the
general principle that, in the absence of fraud, one who does not
choose to read a contract before signing it, cannot later relieve himself of
its burdens.... And in applying that principle, the basic tenent of free-
dom of competent parties to contract is a factor of importance. But in
the framework of modern commercial life and business practices, such
rules cannot be applied on a strict, doctrinal basis.... The traditional con-
tract is the result of free bargaining of parties who are brought together
by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of ap-
proximate economic equality. In such a society there is no danger that
freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole. But
in present-day commercial life the standardized mass contract has ap-
peared. It is used primarily by enterprises with strong bargaining power
and position. "The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is
frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either be-
cause the author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or arti-
ficial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractional
intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by
the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often understood in a
vague way, if at all.' Kessler, 'Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract' 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 632 (1943); Ehren-
zweig, eAdhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Colum. L. Rev.
1072, 1075, 1089 (1953) ... .5
Seven years later, Justice Francis, speaking for the Supreme Court of New
terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed
contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing or of
its proper interpretation.
See also Hanes v. Mitchell, 78 N.D. 341, 49 N.W.2d 606 (1951); Murphy v. Torstrick, 309
S.W.2d 767 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); Independent Directory Corp. v. Vandenbrock, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 313; 94
N.E.2d 228 (Ohio App. 1950).
3 See, Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953); L. B. Foster Co. v. Tri-W.
Construction Co., 409 Pa. 318, 186 A.2d 18 (1962); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cit. 1965).
14 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
15Id. at 386, 389, 161 A.2d 84, 86.
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Jersey,"6 seems to extend the "public policy" doctrine of the Henningsen
case to a contract in which a real estate broker brought an action against
the owners of realty and the prospective purchaser procured by the broker
for the broker's commission after the prospective purchaser was unable to
complete the contract because of financial inability. The court held that
where the failure to complete the sale was due solely to the fault of the
prospective purchaser, the owners were not liable to the broker for any
commission notwithstanding provisions in the brokerage contract to the
contrary which as part of a standardized printed form imposed on the
owner liability for a commission immediately upon execution of a contract
to sell to a buyer produced by the broker, irrespective of whether the buyer
proves unable financially or unwilling for some other unjustifiable reason
to complete the sale. The court concluded that the business of the real es-
tate broker is affected with a public interest. In its opinion the court
stated:
. . . Although courts continue to recognize that persons should not be
unnecessarily restricted in their freedom to contract, there is an increas-
ing willingness to invalidate unconscionable contractional provisions which
dearly tend to injure the public in some way .... 1
The court further stated in explaining the rationale of its decision:
Courts and legislatures have grown increasingly sensitive to imposition,
conscious or otherwise, on members of the public persons with whom
they deal, who through experience, specialization, licensure, economic
strength or position, or membership in associations created for their mutual
benefit and education, have acquired such expertise or monopolistic or
practical control in the business transaction involved as to give them an
undue advantage. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
388-391 (1960).18
In Unico v. Owen,'9 the Supreme Court of New Jersey again faced the
perplexing and delicate matter of resolving the competing doctrines of free-
dom of contract and the standardized mass contract. In this case the court
concluded that a "waiver of defenses" in a conditional sales contract was
unenforceable and invalid in an action by the holder of the note against the
maker of the note. The holder of the note who was the purchaser thereof
was held not to be a holder in due course as against the maker of the note.
The court held that Unico (a partnership) which had been expressly
formed for the purpose of financing conditional sales of consumer goods
and which exercised extensive control over seller's entire business opera-
tion, did not have the status of a holder in due course20 with the respect to
10 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528,236 A.2d 843 (1967).
'1 7d. at 554, 236 A.2d at 857.
'BId. at 553, 263 A.2d at 856.
19 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
20Id. at 121, 232 A.2d 416.
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a note executed by the conditional buyer and assigned to the Unico part-
nership by the seller. It was hence further held by the court that in an ac-
tion on the note the buyer could assert the defense of failure of considera-
tion resulting from the seller's default with respect to delivery of all goods
called for by the conditional sales contract executed contemporaneously
with the note. The court refused to enforce a clause in the contract
whereby the buyer agreed not to assert defenses against an assignee. This
clause was held to be so one-sided as to be contrary to public policy.
The Unico decision, which is admittedly beyond the scope and design
of this article which is concerned essentially with the common law and sec-
tion 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, is mentioned because it
illustrates a growing tendency by the courts to focus attention upon stand-
ardized financing contracts to insure that such contracts must be responsive
to equitable considerations. The Unico case has received judicial recogni-
tion and approval.2 1  Recently a court in following the doctrine of the
Unico case stated:
... However, in our opinion, the doctrine so well stated in Unico strikes
the proper balance between the protection of the commercial need for
negotiability and the individual's need for relief against fraud. As that
court stated, we are impelled to 'join those courts which deny holder in
due course status in consumer goods sales cases to those financers whose
involvement with the seller's business is as close, and whose knowledge
of the extrinsic factors-i.e., the terms of the underlying sale agreement-
is as pervasive, as it is in the present case.' Unico v. Owen, (1967), 50
N.J. 101, 116, 232 A.2d 405, 413.22
The Unico case is also of especial significance as related to matters to
be subsequently discussed in that at least in part the court's decision was
based upon that controversial provision of the Uniform Commercial CodeP
which grants the court the authority to declare a contract unenforceable
when it is deemed to be unconscionable. Referring to a specific provi-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code giving special treatment to waiver
clauses in consumer goods contracts2 and the unconscionable clause of
section 2-302 of the Code, the court concluded:
... We see in the enactment of these two sections of the Code an inten-
tion to leave in the hands of the courts the continued application of com-
mon law principles in deciding in consumer goods cases whether such
waiver clauses as the one imposed on Owen in this case are so one-sided
as to be contrary to public policy. Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Co., 121 U.S. App. D. C. 315, 350 F. 2d 445, 448-449 (1965). For
reasons already expressed, we hold that they are so opposed to such policy
as to require condemnation. As the New Jersey Study Comment to sec-
2 1 American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968).
22 Id. at 6, 240 N.E.2d 889.
23 § 2-302.
2 4 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-206(1).
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tion 2-302 indicates, the practice of denying relief because of unconscion-
able circumstances has long been the rule in this state....2
The court cited the Henningsen and other New Jersey cases holding con-
tracts unenforceable because of unconscionable circumstances. The pre-
vious discussion of typical cases illustrating the propensity of the courts
to permit parties to a contract wide latitude in determining their own
contractual status and the other referred to cases clearly indicating that
the courts are not impervious to hardships imposed by a strict doctrinal
application of freedom of contract may bring back into frustrating focus
the comment of Mr. Justice Holmes that: ". . . certainty generally is illu-
sion, and repose is not the destiny of man. '26
This delicate balance between stability of contract and the protection
against unfairness and unconscionable contractual provisions also brings
to mind the classic statement of Justice Cardozo who said:
I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to find
how tractless was the ocean on which I had embarked. I sought for
certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened when I found that the quest
for it was futile. I was trying to reach land, the solid land of fixed and
settled rules, the paradise of a justice that would declare itself by tokens
plainer and more commanding than its pale and glimmering reflections in
my own vacillating mind and conscience. I found 'with the voyager in
Browning's 'Paracelsus' that the real heaven was always beyond.' As the
years have gone by, and as I have reflected more and more upon the na-
ture of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty,
because I have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the
process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation; and that the
doubts and misgivings, the hopes and fears, are part of the travail of
mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of birth, in which principles that
have served their day expire, and new principles are born.X
It was also Cardozo who reminded us that "the law, like the traveler,
must be ready for the morrow."28 That the common law in its case by case
evolution is ready for the morrow is reflected as a most delicate problem
which calls for enlightened and tempered judicial restraint in the follow-
ing passages from the Henningsen case where the court stated:
The warranty before us is a standardized form designed for mass use. It
is imposed upon the automobile consumer. He takes it or leaves it ... to
buy an automobile. No bargaining is engaged in with respect to it ....
The gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer
in the automobile industry is thus apparent. There is no competition
among the car makers in the area of the express warranty. Where can the
buyer go to negotiate for better protection? Such control and limitation
26 50 N.J. at 125, 232 A.2d at 418.
26 Holmes, Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L R.Ev. 457,466 (1897).
2 7 B. CARnozo, NATu E OF THE JuniciAL PRocEss, 166-67 (1921).
29B. CARDozo, GROWTH OF THn LAW, 20 (1924).
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of his remedies are inimical to the public welfare and, at the very least,
call for great care by the courts to avoid injustice through application of
strict common-law principles of freedom of contract....
Although the courts, with few exceptions, have been most sensitive to
problems presented by contracts resulting from gross disparity in buyer-
seller bargaining positions, they have not articulated a general principle
condemning, as opposed to public policy, the imposition on the buyer of a
skeleton warranty as a means of limiting the responsibility of the manu-
facturer. They have endeavored thus far to avoid a drastic departure
from age-old tenets of freedom of contract by adopting doctrines of strict
construction, and notice and knowledgeable assent by the buyer to the at-
tempted exculpation of the seller.29
The writer of this paper makes no pretense of precision in assisting
the law student or the lawyer in reaching "the solid land of fixed and
settled rules" for which Justice Cardozo quested. It is hoped however that
a discussion of some of the relevant factors wherein the courts attempt
to strike the proper balance between freedom of contract and the pro-
tection of contracting parties from injustice will sharpen and more clearly
delineate the contract and public policy concepts involved. It is submit-
ted that the case law dearly manifests that the lawyer need not be apolo-
getic or feel that he is trafficking in platitudes by telling his client in most
factual situations that 'you are bound by what you sign" and that usually
the parties to a contract determine their contractual status. However,
it is also submitted that a review of typical and representative cases il-
lustrates that the courts have not and are not applying with supine indif-
ference and slavish devotion the traditional concept of freedom of con-
tract. It is also felt that a review of the cases will indicate that there
has been no wholesale deviation from the freedom of concept doctrine
and that much judicial restraint has been exercised in those cases which
on their "peripheral facts"2 0 the courts have felt justified in qualifying
freedom of contract.
The basic thrust of this article is to review representative court de-
cisions reflecting the common law concept of freedom of contract and the
judicial limitations thereon. There is no purpose to cover the myriad of
statutory provisions which have limited, qualified or affected freedom of
contract. It is only to observe the obvious that statutes of various legisla-
tive bodies have become a major source of contract law.1 In addition to
the comprehensive Uniform Commercial Code, there also affects contract
law a growing number of statutes of which the following are only illus-
trative: (1). a recently enacted Ohio statute provides that:
A cardholder who receives a credit card from an issuer, which such card-
holder has not requested nor used, shall not be liable for any use made of
29 32 N.J. 390-91, 161 A.2d 87-88 (1960).
SO Id. at 358, 161 A.2d at 69.
31 The Uniform Commercial Code is a basic example.
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such credit card which has not been authorized by such cardholder, unless
such credit card is in replacement or renewal of a credit card previously
requested or used by the cardholder.3 2
(2) Another Ohio statute which has not been judicially interpreted
seems designed to abrogate the implied acceptance doctrine of the common
law. 3 This statute provides:
Where any merchandise is offered for sale by means of its voluntary de-
livery to an offeree who has neither ordered nor requested it, the delivery
of such merchandise constitutes an unconditional gift to the recipient.34
(3) Various statutes affect the "manifested mutual assent"' 5 of the
seller and buyer in the area of home solicitation sales by providing that
the buyer has the right of recision of the contract during a stated "cooling-
off period." This type of statute grants the buyer the right to cancel a
contract within a short period of time after completion of the sale.8
The new Consumer Credit Protection Acter enacted by Congress grants
the buyer a right of rescission by providing:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any con-
sumer credit transaction in which a security interest is retained or acquired
in any real property which is used or is expected to be used as the resi-
dence of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have
the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business
day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the
disclosures required under this section and all other material disclosures
required under this part, whichever is later by notifying the creditor, in
accordance with the regulations of the Board, of his intention to do So.38
Attention will now be given to a categorization of typical court deci-
sions which fall into four suggested classifications: (1) A review will be
made of representative court decisions applying the basic freedom of con-
tract doctrine. These cases illustrate that American courts traditionally
take the view that competent contracting parties may contract on their
own terms provided such contract terms are neither illegal nor contrary
to public policy and that in the absence of such factors as fraud, mistake
or duress, the party who enters into a contract is bound thereby, however
improvident the bargain might be. (2) A review will be made of cases
3 2 OHIO REV. CODE § 1319.01 (Page Supp. 1969). The cases relative to the contractual
liability of the person who loses his credit card are reviewed in Sears, Ropbuck and Co. v. Duke,
441 S.W.2d 521 (Texas Sup. Ct. 1969).
33 Austin v. Burge, 156 Mo. App. 286, 137 S.W. 618 (1911).
34 OIO REV. CODE § 1333.60 (Page Supp. 1969).
35 RESTATmiEN'r OF CoNTRAcTs, § 20 (1932).
30 See GA. CODE ANN. § 96-906 (Supp. 1968); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 255 D, Section 14
(1968); MIcEL Coinp. LAws ANN. § 445.1202(c) (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-2-503
(Supp. 1969).
37 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635 (Supp. 1969).
38 Id.
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indicating that courts have refused to enforce contracts deemed to be un-
conscionable. The basic purpose of this categorization is to review the
judicial limitations on the liberty of contract and to point out that free-
dom of contract has not been permitted to override all concepts of public
interest and public policy. (3) This category will reveal the various
rules of interpretation whereby the courts short of finding that a contract
was unconscionable and hence unenforceable have found in oblique and
somewhat abstruse nuances of language and interpretation bases for hold-
ing that some harsh or otherwise exculpatory provision would not be ap-
plied. (4) Lastly, considerations will be given to the controversial sec-
tion 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code which authorizes a court to
refuse enforcement of a contract if it determines such contract or any
clause thereof to have been unconscionable at the time it was made. To
explore the "unconscionable" provision of the Code in extended depth
would be in the alternative an exercise in superfluity or a super arroga-
tion in view of the welter of legal articles exploring with conjectural
analysis the meaning or amorphous lack of meaning of the unconsdon-
ability clause.s9 No attempt will be made to cover the various other pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code such as those that operate in a
negative way to prohibit the inclusion of certain contract terms and those
that operate in a more positive way to require the inclusion of certain
terms.40
I. FREEDOM OF CONTRAT-A CONCEPT OF
CONTINUING VITALITY
With no intendment to be exhaustive, review will now be made of
various court decisions which are typical of the judicial application of free-
dom of contract. Before so doing, it seems appropriate to merely note
that freedom of contract and the power of the contracting parties to con-
trol the rights and obligations they create seems to be a basic feature of
the second Restatement of Contracts that is now in progress. The adher-
ence to freedom of contract in the second Restatement is indicated in the
use of the qualifying phrases such as "unless otherwise agreed" or "unless
a contrary intention is manifested."4' That the writers of Restatement
second recognized restrictions on the freedom of contract is made evident
in the comments,42 but it also seems clear that freedom of contract is still
the basic theme in the second Restatement, for the comments state: "The
39 In his article, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 485, 486 n. 3 (1966-67), Professor Arthur Leff indicates that there are in excess of
130 discussions of section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code in various legal periodicals.
4
osee, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(10), 2-316(2), 2-209(2), 2-201(2).
4 1 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 98 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
42 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note & Section 5A,
comments b, c (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
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governing principle in the typical case is that bargains are enforceable
unless some other principle conficts."43
That freedom of contract is not unlimited, however, is specifically rec-
ognized in the Restatement of Contracts, Second, in the Tentative Draft
No. 5, March 31, 1970 where in a new Section 234 it is provided that a
court may refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or term thereof.
This new Section which closely follows Section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the con-
tract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit
the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscion-
able result.44
In the previously referred decision of Blount v. Smith,45 the Ohio Su-
preme Court was asked by the plaintiff, Dr. Blount, through a declaratory
judgment action to ignore the provision of a partnership contract among
doctors which provisions severely restricted a withdrawing doctor's receipt
of accounts receivable representing fees for his services rendered during
the entire balance of the fiscal year in which the doctor withdrew. The
evidence in the record before the court was unsatisfactory and did not
show Dr. Blount was the victim of any fraud, deception or fraud with
respect to the consummation of the contract. The court refused any re-
lief to Dr. Blount and held that it would leave the litigants in the position
which their contracts placed them. The court concluded:
We are asked by plaintiff to approve the brushing aside of the explicit
terms of a contract which, we must assume, in absence of a showing to the
contrary, was executed on his part without misunderstanding or imposi-
tion. A court is required to approach that task with no less restraint than
in striking down a statute.46
In Ullmann v. May47 it was held that a salesman could not recover any
compensation on the basis of contract or quantum meruit because the sales-
man received from his employer precisely what was called for by their
contract. The plaintiff, Ullmann, entered into a contract with his em-
ployer to perform the services of a salesman. The employer agreed to
pay Ullmann commissions and bonuses as provided in their written con-
tract. The contract contained the two following controlling provisions:
In addition to payment due under provisions above, commissions will be
paid employee as shown below on all sums of money billed to, and col-
4 3 REsTATENfENT (SEcoND) o0 CONTRACTs § 19, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
4 4 REsTATElENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACT § 234 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
4G 12 Ohio St. 2d 41,231 N.E.2d 301 (1967).
46Id. at 46-7, 231 N.E.2d 305.
47 147 Ohio St. 468, 72 N.E.2d 63 (1947).
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lected from each individual client personally procured by the employee;
said commissions to be paid only during the time this agreement remains
in full force and effect.48
Another provision of the contract provided that:
This contract of employment may be terminated by either of the parties
hereto upon giving to the other party not less than seven days written no-
tice of the intention to cancel this agreement.4 9
In accordance with these contractual provisions the employer gave to Ull-
mann, the salesman, written notice of the cancellation of his services. It
was held that under the contractual provisions quoted the salesman Ull-
mann was not entitled to be paid a commission on billings and collections
made subsequent to the termination of the contract. The syllabus of
the court states:
Where a written agreement is plain and unambiguous it does not become
ambiguous by reason of the fact that in its operation it will work a hard-
ship on one of the parties thereto and corresponding advantage to the
other. (Ohio Crane Co. v. Hicks, 110 Ohio St., 168, approved and fol-
lowed) .P
The freedom of contract rationale of the Ullmann case was relied
upon by a federal court many years later.51 An attorney in his letter con-
tract with his client offered to present the client's claim to a state board
on a related matter ". . . without charge to you . . . out of any recovery
in your claim, you are to pay me a percentage figure acceptable to you .... " 2
The attorney prepared the proper claim and recovered $137,341.81. The
evidence indicated that both the attorney and his client knew and under-
stood that the attorney's normal charge was twenty-five per cent of any
recovery, which in the case would have amounted to $34,335.45. How-
ever, the client notified the attorney that the client had determined that
$2,000.00 was adequate payment for the attorney's services. The court
denied the attorney's action for recovery of additional fees, holding that
in accordance with the terms of the contract, the client had the contractual
right to pay the attorney the $2,000.00 which $2,000.00 amount the court
held was not in itself sufficient to justify an inference of fraud or bad
faith.
In 1962, Inman v. Clyde Hall Drilling Company, Inc., 3 presented an
interesting case to the Alaska Supreme Court wherein an employee en-
tered into a written contract to work as a derrickman for an oil drilling
48 Id. at 470, 72 N.E.2d 67.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 468, 72 N.X.2d at 64.
51 Hogan v. Wright, 356 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1966).
52 Id.
53 369 P.2d 498 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1962).
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company. One portion of the written contract set forth as a condition
precedent that the employee agreed that he would within thirty days after
any claim arose out of or in connection with the employment give writ-
ten notice to the company for such claim and setting forth in detail the
facts relative thereto. The court held that this provision of the employ-
ment contract was not void as contrary to public policy, and the failure of
the employee to give such notice within such time limitation barred the
employee's action against the employer for damages for alleged breach
of the employment contract. The court's decision was based on the basic
rationale that "competent parties are free to contract and are bound by
their agreements. ' 'a 4  In its opinion the court further stated:
In the absence of a constitutional provision or statute which makes cer-
tain contracts illegal or unenforceable, we believe it is the function of the
judiciary to allow men to manage their own affairs in their own way.55
In the course of the opinion in the Inman case the court referred to
the Henningsen case and stated that:
We recognize 'that freedom of contract' is a qualified and not an absolute
right, and can not be applied on a strict, doctrinal basis. An established
principle is that a court will not permit itself to be used as an instrument
of the inequity and injustice.56
The court found, however, that the doctrine of Henningsen was here in-
applicable and applied the traditional freedom of contract doctrine. In
so doing, the court concluded:
There was nothing to suggest that Inman (the employee) did not have the
knowledge, capacity or opportunity to read the agreement and understand
it; that the terms of the contract were imposed upon him without any real
freedom of choice on his part; that there was any substantial inequality
in bargaining positions between Inman and the Company. Not only did
he attach a copy of the contract to his complaint, which negatives any
thought that he really wasn't aware of its provisions, but he also admitted
in a deposition that at the time he signed the contract he had read it, had
discussed it with a Company representative, and was familiar with its
terms.5 7
Freedom of contract was adhered to by the much respected Court of
Appeals of New York in a 1961 decision58 in which recovery was denied
to a wife for personal injuries and to her husband for medical expenses
and loss of services, resulting from injuries which the wife sustained as
the result of a fall at or near the edge of a swimming pool located on the





58 Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925 (1961).
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sium operator who admitted persons as members or patrons under a
written contract which dearly provided as a condition of membership
that such member or patron relieved the operator from liability for the
operator's negligence. After reviewing various cases concerning this ex-
culpatory clause, the court held that the clause barred recovery under the
complaint of the plaintiff charging ordinary negligence. The court
pointed out that exculpatory clauses in a contract designed to protect one
of the parties from liability resulting from his own negligence are closely
scrutinized by the courts but that in this case, the contractual provision
was expressed in clear and unequivocal language and the wife who be-
came a member of the defendant's gymnasium pursuant to such contract
was barred from recovery. In the course of its opinion, the court pointed
out that exculpatory clauses have been held unenforceable when contained
in the contract of carriage of a common carrier or in the contract of a
public utility or when imposed by the employer as a condition of em-
ployment. In concluding its opinion the court reflected its rationale as
follows:
Here there is no special legal relationship and no overriding public in-
terest which demand that this contract provision, voluntarily entered into
by competent parties, should be rendered ineffectual. Defendant, a pri-
vate corporation, was under no obligation or legal duty to accept plaintiff
as a "member" or patron. Having consented to do so, it had the right
to insist upon such terms as it deemed appropriate. Plaintiff, on the
other hand, was not required to assent to unacceptable terms, or to give
up a valuable legal right, as a condition precedent to obtaining employ-
ment or being able to make use of the services rendered by a public carrier
or utility. She voluntarily applied for membership in a private organiza-
tion, and agreed to the terms upon which this membership was bestowed.
She may not repudiate them now.09
The courts have applied the freedom of contract concept in an infinite
variety of factual circumstances. To avoid undue prolongation of this
article and to conclude it in "our time," reference will be made to a few
additional cases. It has been held that an exculpatory clause releasing a
circus from all claims and demands growing out of any injury or accident
to a trapeze artist during the period of performance under the contract
released the circus from liability for ordinary negligence for injuries sus-
tained by the performer during her act.6"
In an action for breach of contract brought by the plaintiff, an oil
jobber, against the defendant, The Pure Oil Company, it was held that
59 Id. at 297-98, 177 N.E.2d 927.
60 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Olvera, 119 F.2d 584 (9th Cir.
1941). See also D'Onofrio v. Sun Oil Company, 277 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1960) where an ex-
culpatory clause immunized the lessor, Sun Oil Company from injuries to lessee, a service sta-
tion operator. The injuries to lessee resulted from the alleged negligence of the oil company
in repair of hoist which collapsed and dropped down on lessee.
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under a long term contract requiring the plaintiff-buyer to give the oil
company-seller written notice on the first day of each month during the
existence of the contract of every claim that buyer had against seller and
providing that failure to do so would constitute a release of such claim,
it was held that such provision was not unreasonable or contrary to public
policy and was a condition precedent to maintenance of action by the
plaintiff.6 '
An exculpatory clause was held valid as part of an agreement between
the participant in and the proprietor of a stock car race whereby the par-
ticipant assumed the risk of injury resulting from his participation in such
event. It was further held that such exculpatory clause in the contract
released the proprietor of the track from any claims for damages by the
participant and that such clause was not invalid as against public policy.62
However, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in a 1967 decision held a
similar exculpatory clause in a stock car racing contract to be invalid as
against public policy because such clause purported to contract away safety
requirements for stock car racing prescribed by statute.13
II. EXCULPATORY CLAUSES IN REAL EsTATE LEASES
The courts have frequently faced the question of whether the freedom
of contract concept applies to exculpatory clauses which are designed to
protect a landlord from his negligence or that of his employee. One well-
known case which held that the tenant was barred from recovery because
the lease contained an exculpatory clause protecting the landlord from
liability for his negligence met with swift legislative response.64 In hold-
ing that the exculpatory clause protected the landlord from liability, the
court stated:
Freedom of contract is basic to our law. But when that freedom expresses
itself in a provision designed to absolve one of the parties from the con-
sequences of his own negligence, there is danger that the standards of
conduct which the law has developed for the protection of others may be
diluted.... The relationship of landlord and tenant does not have the
monopolistic characteristics that have characterized some other relations
with respect to which exculpatory clauses have been held invalid. There
are literally thousands of landlords who are in competition with one an-
other. . . . Judicial determinations of public policy cannot readily take
account of sporadic and transitory circumstances. They should rather,
we think, rest upon a durable moral basis.65
61 Brooks v. The Pure Oil Company, 126 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Ky. 1954).
0 2French v. Special Services, Inc., 107 Ohio App. 435, 159 N.E.2d 785 (1958); in accord,
Hine v. The Dayton Speedway Corp. 20 Ohio App. 2d 185, 252 N.E.2d 648 (1969).
C, McCarthy v. Nat. Assoc. For Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 48 N.J. 539, 226 A. 2d 713
(1967).64 O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Company, 15 II. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545
(1958). Following this decision, the Illinois legislature enacted a law which invalidates such
clauses in leases. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 80, § 15a (1959).
65 15 11l. 2d at 438,440-41, 155 N.E.2d at 546-7.
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The court recognized that the State of New York by statute had made
exculpatory clauses in leases invalid.66 As will be indicated at a further
point other courts have held such exculpatory clauses in leases to be in-
valid. 7
In 1961 the Supreme Court of Alabama 8 held valid an exculpatory
clause in a lease whereby the tenant waived any claim for damages against
the landlord from injuries resultant from any defects in the apartment
building which existed at the date of the lease or which arose subsequent
thereto. The court held that this exculpatory clause barred recovery by
the tenant since such clause was part of a contract binding upon the
parties and that such clause was not contrary to public policy.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in Talley v. Skelly Oil Company"9 held
that the sub-lessee of a gasoline service station was barred from recovery
by an exculpatory clause for injuries sustained when an overhead heater
slipped from its moorings and struck the sub-lessee in the back. The
exculpatory clause in the sub-lessee's lease with the Skelly Oil Company
waived the sub-lessee's right to damages for any injury due to the negli-
gence of the lessor. The sub-lessee who operated the service station main-
tained that the clause was void as against public policy. The court, while
holding that exculpatory contracts are not favored in the law and are to
be strictly construed, nevertheless found that in the absence of statute the
court could discern no public policy which was violated by the exculpa-
tory clause in question. In reaching this conclusion the court followed
what it stated to be a general rule that exculpatory agreements volun-
tarily entered into by parties standing on an equal footing are enforceable
as between the contracting parties themselves. In support of its conclu-
sion the court cited a decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals70 which
held valid a clause exempting a landlord from liability to a tenant for
injuries occurring on premises in an apartment house and also relied upon
the following statement in Williston:
Though the relationship of landlord and tenant is such that its incidence
have been regulated by statute to some extent, it is clear that apart from
statute a landlord may at common law exempt himself from liability for
negligence.71
The court further noted as distinguishable the case of Hunter v. Amefi-
66 Id. at 441, 155 N.E.2d at 547.
67 Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc.,
33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955).
68 Baker v. Wheeler, Lacey & Brown, Inc., 272 Ala. 101, 128 So. 2d 721 (1961).
69 199 Kan. 767, 433 P.2d 425 (1967).
70 Eastern Ave. Corp. v. Hughes, 228 Md. 477, 180 A.2d 486 (1962). The Maryland
legislature subsequently enacted legislation which declared such exculpatory clauses invalid. 5
Md. Ann. Code, art. 53, Section 40 (1957).
716 S. WILLIsTON, CoN'RAcrs § 1751C (Revised Edition, 1938). See also Restatement
of Contracts, Sections 574 and 575 (1932).
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can Rentals, Inc.,72 which held invalid an exculpatory clause in a car
trailer rental contract which absolved the rental company from liability in
case of accident. The renter of the trailer was injured when a hitch
broke and the trailer swayed and overturned Hunter's automobile. In the
Hunter case the court concluded that the clause was contrary to public
policy of the state reflected in safety statutes applicable to the business
of renting trailers to the public.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire 73 has squarely held that a land-
lord could not relieve himself of duty to use ordinary care to keep the
stairs in a building leading to tenements in reasonably safe condition by
contract with the tenant. Hence, the court further held that the exculpa-
tory clause in the lease did not exempt the landlord from liability where
the tenant was injured while descending a defective stairway.
A New Jersey court has also held that when the negligence of a land-
lord amounts to the creation and maintenance of a nuisance an exculpa-
tory clause will not protect the landlord from liability. In this case the
court stated:
We also take judicial notice that under present housing conditions the
bargaining positions of landlord and tenant in an apartment building are
decidedly unequal .... 4
With respect to industrial and commercial leases containing exculpa-
tory clauses, the courts have applied the freedom of contract doctrine and
upheld such clauses on the basis that exculpatory clauses in leases of in-
dustrial property are valid since no inequality of bargining power exists.7 5
In the 1967 decision of Mayfair Fabrics v. Henlef 6 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that a commercial tenant could not recover
from the landlord for the tenant's personal property destroyed in a fire
caused by the landlord's negligence. The lease contained an exculpatory
clause absolving the landlord for loss or damage to the tenant's property
72 189 Kan. 615, 371 P.2d 131 (1962). Other courts have also held invalid exculpatory
clauses as being contrary to public policy which policy the court discerned in statutory provi-
sions. In Feldman v. Stein Building & Lumber Co., 6 Mich. App. 180, 148 N.W.2d 544
(1967) the court held invalid an exculpatory clause in a residential lease which provided that
the landlord was not liable for damage or injury occasioned by snow, water or ice upon or near
the leased premises. The exculpatory clause was deemed to be contrary to the Michigan hous-
ing law imposing duty to keep the premises dean which statutory duty the court concluded
also applied to snow and ice removal.
It has also been held that a lessor was not exculpated, by an exculpatory clause in a lease,
from liability for property damage from lessor's own negligent acts violative of Ohio Building
Code. American States Insurance Co. v. The Hannan Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 988
(N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 392 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1968).
73 Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941).
74 Kuzmiak v. Bookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 587, 111 A.2d 425, 432 (1955).
75Midland Carpet Corp. v. Franklin Association Properties, 90 N.J. Super. 42, 216 A.2d
231 (1966); Moreira Construction Co. v. Moretrench Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 391, 235 A.2d 211
(1967).
76 48 N.J. 483, 226 A.2d 602 (1967).
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by fire, explosion, or otherwise. The court concluded that "As in Mid-
land, the parties here were not in unequal bargaining positions." 77
But the parade of exculpatory lease cases continues. A 1970 court of
appeals decision in Washington"8 indicates that freedom of contract is
deeply ensconsed in the law. The court held that two apartment tenants
could not recover for injuries allegedly caused by the landlord's negligent
maintenance of common passageways. The leases of the tenants contained
the following exculpatory clause:
That neither the Lessor, nor his Agent, shall be liable for any injury to
Lessee, his family, guests or employees or any other person entering the
premises or the building of which the demised premises are a part.Th
The court concluded that this exculpatory clause was valid and not
contrary to public policy of the State of Washington and so holding re-
lied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court of Washington 0 and Sec-
tion 575 of the original Restatement of Contracts.
It was also noted by the court that statutes in some states have been
enacted declaring such exculpatory clauses to be void. 1
III. STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
In various cases the courts have avoided a direct confrontation with
the freedom of contract concept with respect to various types of exculpa-
tory clauses by adopting various nuances of the rule that such clauses will
be strongly construed against the user thereof. The New York Court of
Appeals in a 1963 case" held that contracts will not be construed to
absolve a party from or indemnify him against his own negligence unless
such intention is expressed in unequivocal terms. The basic question in
the case was whether a written notice which accompanied film sold to the
plaintiff, a corporation engaged in commercial photography, by the de-
fendant, a film company, was effectual to limit the film company's liability
for any negligence in the processing of the film. During the development
of the film by the defendant a substantial portion was so damaged by a
deposit of foreign material and by ink marks that much of the film be-
came commercially valueless. The defendant took the position that it was
not liable to the plaintiff for over $1500 which the plaintiff incurred in
expenses retaking certain sequences with the film in order to fulfill its
contractual obligations with another party. In taking this position the de-
77Id. at 488, A.2d at 605.
7  McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 469 P.2d 997 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
' 1d. at 998.
80 Broderson v. Rainer Nat'l Park Co., 187 Wash. 399, 60 P.2d 234 (1936); Griffiths v.
Henry Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947).
S 469 P.2d at 998.




fendant relied upon a "notice" set forth on a label on the box containing
the film. The notice stated rather plainly, in black type against a white
background:
FILM PRICE DOES NOT INCLUDE PROCESSING . .. R ADTHis
NOTICE. This film will be replaced if defective in manufacture, labeling,
or packaging, or if damaged or lost by us or any subsidiary company. Ex-
cept for such replacement, the sale or subsequent handling of this film for
any purpose is without warranty or other liability of any kind. Since dyes
used with color films, like other dyes, may, in time, change, this film will
not be replaced for, or otherwise warranted against, any change in color.1s
It was conceded that the plaintiff was aware of the nature of the label's
contents and the only question for decision by the court was whether the
above quoted notice effectively limited the defendant's liability for negli-
gence in developing the film. The court stated:
The law looks with disfavor upon attempts of a party to avoid liability for
his own fault and, although it is permissible in many cases to contract
one's self out of liability for negligence, the courts insist that it must be
absolutely dear that such was the understanding of the parties. In other
words, it must be plainly and precisely provided that 'limitation of liabil-
ity extends to negligence or other fault of the party attempting to shed his
ordinary responsibility.'84
Here the court cited many cases including the case where an exculpatory
clause prevented recovery by a member of a health studio who sustained
an injury due to the slippery condition of the area around the swimming
pools 5
The court concluded that the quoted clause did not immunize the de-
fendant from liability because such notice failed to unequivocally state
that the parties had agreed to limit the manufacturer's liability for its own
negligence and the label notice that the film price did not include the
processing, did not limit the liability of the defendant (manufacturer) for
any negligence in processing of the film after exposure.
That a court can adroitly avoid a direct clash between freedom of
contract and the needs of public policy is manifested by an Illinois lower
court decision 0 where it was held that an exculpatory clause in a lease did
not protect the landlord from injury sustained by the tenant when the
tenant was struck on the head by falling plaster while make a condolence
call on another tenant in the same apartment building. The lessor of the
apartment building pleaded as a defense a typical exculpatory clause very
83 Id. at 303, 189 N.E.2d at 694.
F41,. at 304, 189 N.E.2d at 694.
85 Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 220 N.Y.S.2d 962, 177 N.E.2d 925 (1961).
861Moss v. Hunding, 27 Il1. App. 2d 189, 169 N.E.2d 396 (1960), see also Kay v. The
Pennsylvania Rd. Co., 156 Ohio St. 503, 103 N.E.2d 751 (1952) where it was held contracts
of indemnity purporting to relieve one from the results of his own negligence must be strictly
construed and the intention to not so indemnify must be expressed in clear, unequivocal terms.
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broad in scope which seemed to immunize the lessor from any negligence
in or around the apartment building. The plaintiff, however, contended
that the clause was inapplicable to his action because the wrong of which
he complained was commited by the lessor in circumstances outside of
the lessor-lessee relationship. In short, the plaintiff contended that he was
injured while he was an invitee of another tenant. The court concurred
with the view of the plaintiff and held the exculpatory clause inapplicable
based upon the rationale that the clause applied to the plaintiff only in
his status as a lessee and not as an invitee of another tenant. The familiar
rule of interpretation was applied by the court that "an agreement pro-
tecting one from the consequences of his own negligence must be in dear
and explicit language or expressed in unequivocal terms."87 This rea-
soning was buttressed by the further conclusion of the court that ambig-
uous language in a lease will be construed most strongly against the lessor.
The defendant contended that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court
in O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co.", was here applicable.
However, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not question the ap-
plicability of the exculpatory clause to the circumstances of the action in
the O'Callaghan case, and hence the court felt that it was not bound to
follow the doctrine of that case.
A Pennsylvania court 9 has held an exculpatory clause inapplicable in
the following factual situation: A minor child was injured when a mantle
in a home, rented by the child's parents, fell upon her. The defense of
the lessor was an exculpatory clause which exempted the lessor from negli-
gence or from any injury to the lessees in areas of the home set forth
in great detail. The parents of the injured did not contest the validity
of the exculpatory clause since at that time the validity of such clauses
between lessors and lessees in Pennsylvania had been firmly established by
a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.90 The court held that the
clause did not exempt the lessor from liability for the injury to the child
because the court concluded that the clause did not specifically release
the lessor for negligence which did not arise during the lease term. It
was the conclusion of the court that the unsafe construction of the mantle
existed prior to the commencement of the lease term with knowledge of
the lessors and without the knowledge of the lessees and hence the ex-
culpatory clause by its own terms was inapplicable. The court also stressed
that an exculpatory provision in a lease must be construed strongly against
the landlord.
Three recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 1 when
87 27 Ill. App. 2d at 193, 169 N.E.2d at 399.
88 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1958).
8 0 Strothman v. Houggy, 186 Pa. Super. 638, 142 A.2d 769 (1958).
9OManius v. Housing Authority of City of Pittsburgh, 350 Pa. 512, 39 A.2d 614 (1944).
91 Galligan v. Arovitch, 421 Pa. 301, 219 A.2d 463 (1966); Employers Liability Assur-
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contrasted with the 1944 decision of that court in Manius v. Housing Au-
thority of City of Pittsburgh,92 clearly indicate that the court now does a
great deal more in construing exculpatory clauses than merely adhere to
the freedom of contract rubric. In the 1944 Manius case, the court held
valid an exculpatory clause in a lease entered into between the lessor, the
City of Pittsburgh Housing Authority and a tenant, which clause released
the city-landlord from liability for any injury resulting from any cause
except willful acts. The court held this clause valid as not being in con-
travention of public policy. However, the three recent decisions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously adverted to indicate a much more
sophisticated approach to the area of exculpatory clauses than was reflected
in the Afanius decision. In the 1966 decision, Galligan v. Arovitch92 the
court was faced with the factual situation in which the widow, as a lessee,
brought an action against her lessor for injuries sustained when the widow-
lessee tripped on the lawn area in front of the lessor's apartment building.
As a defense the lessor relied upon an exculpatory clause which set forth
in great detail that the lessee agreed to relieve the lessor from all liability
by reason of any damage or injury to any property or to the lessee or les-
see's guests, servants and employees, which may arise from or be due to
the use of various specified areas and portions of the apartment building.
However, the plaintiff contended that the exculpatory clause was inoper-
ative in this case because the injury to the plaintiff did not occur at one of
the locations specified in the exculpatory clause. It was further contended
more broadly by the plaintiff that the clause was void as being contrary
to public policy. As a starting point in its decision the court stated the
following rule of interpretation:
An agreement or instrument which reduces legal rights which would
otherwise exist is strictly construed against the party asserting it and must
spell out with the utmost particularity the intention of the parties. Morton
v. Ambridge Borough, 375 Pa. 630, 101 A. 2d 661 (1954). Likewise,
the rules of construction require that a written instrument be strictly con-
strued against the maker ....
The court further concluded that the plaintiff was injured on the lawn
area of the lessor's premises but that the exculpatory clause purported to
relieve the lessor of liability, for injury or damage occurring at any one
of seven places-elevators, hatches, openings, stairways, fire escapes, hall-
ways and sidewalks-none of which included the lawn. The court per-
mitted the plaintiff to recover, holding that the exculpatory clause did not
apply to the injury to the plaintiff which took place in the lawn area.
ance Corp. v. Greenville Business Men's Association, 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966);
Kotwasinski v. Rasner, 436 Pa. 32, 258 A.2d 865 (1969).
92350 Pa. 512, 39 A.2d 614 (1944).
03 421 Pa. 301, 219 A.2d 463 (1966).
01 Id. at 303, 219 A.2d at 465.
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However, as related to freedom of contract, the court did not confine its
decision by reference to the rules of strict construction. While the court
stated that it felt that the rules of strict construction were alone sufficient
to render the exculpatory clause inapplicable to this factual situtation, the
writer of the court's opinion, Justice Cohen, also noted that the policy
considerations, which, although not necessary to the decision, reflect his
personal observation, do bear some relevance. At this point the opinion
of the court reads:
The exculpatory clause is today contained in every form lease and, un-
derstandably enough, landlords are unwilling to strike therefrom that pro-
vision which strongly favors them. Thus it is fruitless for the prospective
tenant of an apartment to seek a lease having no exculpatory clause. The
result is that the tenant has no bargaining power and must accept his land-
lord's terms. There is no meeting of the minds, and the agreement is in
effect a mere contract of adhesion, whereby the tenant simply adheres to a
document which he is powerless to alter, having no alternative other than
to reject the transaction entirely. It is obvious that analysis of the form
lease in terms of traditional contract principles will not suffice, for those
rules were developed for negotiated transactions, which embody the inten-
tion of both parties. (Emphasis supplied) Note, The Form 50 Lease:
Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion Contract, 111 U. PA. L. RMv. 1197,
1206 (1963). I do not dispute the rule that a covenant against liability
for acts of negligence is valid and enforceable when entered into by pri-
vate individuals in furtherance of their personal affairs. Cannon v. Bresch,
307 Pa. 31, 160 A. 595 (1932). But I do believe that such a rule neces-
sarily assumes that each party is a free bargaining agent, which, it is evi-
dent, a prospective tenant for an apartment being unable to bargain away
an exculpatory clause, is not.95
It is interesting to note that two additional judges concurred in the
result on the ground that the exculpatory clause which was relied upon
by the court below to immunize the lessor from liability did not repre-
sent the meeting of the minds but rather constituted a contract of adhe-
sion violative of public policy and which should not be given legal effect.
Two judges dissented.
Six months later in 1966 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Em-
ployers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Business Men's Associa-
tion,96 considered a case in which the lessor of a building for various busi-
ness uses relied upon an exculpatory clause in a lease when the lessor was
sued by various tenants for damages caused by the building's water
sprinkling system which became activated and caused flooding and damage
to the lessee's premises prior to the execution of the lease. It was con-
tended in the case that the exculpatory clause relieving the lessor from
liability was inapplicable because the lessor's failure to keep the water
95 Id. at 304-05, 219 A.2d at 465.
90 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966).
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pipes at the proper level or to keep the building heated so that the water
in the low places in the pipes would not freeze, occurred prior to the execu-
tion of the lease. The court noted that despite the general validity of
exculpatory provisions certain interpretive standards have been established
before an exculpatory provision will be construed to relieve a person of
liability for his own or his servant's acts of negligence. The court sum-
marized the standards:
(1) contracts providing for immunity from liability for negligence must
be construed strictly since they are not favorites of the law ... ; (2) such
contracts 'must spell out the intention of the parties with the greatest of
particularity'... ; (3) such contracts must be construed with every in-
tendment against the party who seeks the immunity from liability... ;
(4) the burden to establish immunity from liability is upon the party who
asserts such immunity... .7
Adhering to these rules of interpretation, the court concluded that the
exculpatory clause was not intended to operate prospectively and would
not preclude an action against the lessor for damages caused by the water
sprinkler system which became activated and caused flooding to lessee's
premises prior to the execution of the lease.
In 1969 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court98 was again faced with the
recurring problem as to whether an exculpatory clause was sufficiently
clear and exact to exculpate a lessor from liability. In this case commer-
cial tenants as lessees brought an action against the lessor because the les-
see's property was damaged when the sprinkler system in the leased build-
ing froze and burst, thereby releasing water and damaging property of
the tenants. The leases contained various exculpatory clauses which
spelled out in great detail that the lessors were relieved from all liability
for negligence of themselves or their agents. The court held that the ex-
culpatory clauses did not protect the lessor from liability. The court re-
lied upon the Employers case and held that in order for an exculpatory
clause in a written lease purporting to extend immunity from liability
for negligent conduct to embrace such conduct occurring before as well
as after the execution of the lease, the intent of the parties to that effect
must be expressed with utmost clarity and without any ambiguity. At one
point in the opinion the court said that the instant case and Employers
are strikingly similar for in both cases the tenants alleged that the condi-
tion which resulted in the water flow occurred prior to the lease and ten-
ants had no knowledge or reason to know of the condition. The court
then made an interesting comment:
The instant case is, if anything, stronger than Employers. There the ex-
07 d. at 292, 224 A.2d at 623.
98 Korwasinski v. Rasner, 436 Pa. 32,258 A.2d 865 (1969).
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culpatory dause was typed into a printed lease, not, as here, part of the
fine print of the lease where it would least likely be found. 99
It would seem evident that while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
these recent cases has stated that generally exculpatory clauses are valid,
the court has carefully circumscribed legal enforcement of such clauses
with strict rules of interpretation, and that the recent cases in denying
the applicability of exculpatory clauses to specific factual situations cer-
tainly challenges the ingenuity of contract drafters and makes it manifest
that unless such clauses are models of clarity they may well meet with
judicial rebuff.
It should also be noted that the Manius case, where the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania sustained the validity of an exculpatory clause in a lease
between a tenant and a public housing authority, has been rejected by
the Supreme Court of Washington in a 1967 decision, Thomas v. Housing
Authority of City of Bremerton,100 where an exculpatory clause in tenant's
written lease with the public housing authority was held unenforceable
as contrary to public policy. The litigation involved an action against
the city housing authority for injuries sustained by tenants' child who was
scalded by hot water allegedly because of the authority's negligent main-
tenance of a hot water heater. The court concluded that a decision of
the Supreme Court of Alabama,' which held invalid an exculpatory
clause in the lease of a public housing authority, was more carefully rea-
soned than the Manius case.
IV. ABUSE OF BARGAINING POWER-FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT NOT AN ILLIMITABLE DOCTRINE
The result reached by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the 1960
opinion in the Henningsen case 0 2 has a special significance in not only
the result but also the rationale used to arrive at the decision. The court
forthrightly held that a disclaimer clause in the form contract purchase
order for a new automobile which purported to limit liability for breach
of warranty to replacement of defective parts was invalid as being inimical
to public policy. The factual situation of the case was not complex. In
1955 a new Plymouth sedan was purchased by Mr. & Mrs. Henningsen.
About ten days later while the automobile was being driven by Mrs. Hen-
ningsen she heard a loud noise from the bottom of the hood, and she
testified that the steering wheel spun in her hands and the car crashed into
a highway sign and a brick wall causing her substantial personal injury.
At the trial, the evidence indicated that the accident was the result of a
99 ld. at -, 258 A.2d at 869.
100 71 Wash. 2d 69, 426 P.2d 836 (1967).
101 Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 14 So. 2d 527 (1943).
102 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
[Vol. 31
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
mechanical defect or failure. The purchase order contract form signed
by Mr. Henningsen was a typical printed form of one page. In an ad-
dition to the usual description of the automobile and accessories to be
sold, the form contained two paragraphs on the front indicating that the
front and back of the form comprised the entire agreement between the
parties. The disclaimer clause was contained on the back of the form
in the terms of an express warranty by the manufacturer providing that
the manufacturer promised to replace any parts of the auto which were
defective because of material or workmanship within ninety days after.
delivery of the car or before the vehicle was driven four thousand miles,
whichever first occurred. This express warranty was followed by the lan-
guage of the disclaimer that
... [t]his warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed
or implied, and all other obligations or liabilities on its [the manufac-
turer's] part ... 03
Many of the key passages from the opinion of the court in the Hen-
ningsen case have already been referred to. Suffice at this point to again
note that Justice Francis emphasized the lack of competition among the
car makers as to warranty protection and stressed that the car buyer has
no place to go to negotiate for better protection. The ". . gross in-
equality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the automo-
bile industry . . .,1104 is emphasized by the opinion. The court concluded
that the disclaimer clause was unenforceable because it was contrary to
public policy. With respect to public policy the court stated:
Public policy is a term not easily defined. Its significance varies as the
habits and needs of a people may vary. It is not static and the field of ap-
plication is an ever increasing one. A contract, or a particular provision
therein, valid in one era may be wholly opposed to the public policy of
another .... Courts keep in mind the principle that the best interests of
society demand that persons should not be unnecessarily restricted in their
freedom to contract. But they do not hesitate to declare void as against
public policy contractual provisions which dearly tend to the injury of
the public in some way.105
Having noted that the concept "public policy" defies easy definition Justice
Francis concluded:
In the framework of this case, illuminated as it is by the facts and the
many decisions noted, we are of the opinion that Chrysler's attempted dis-
daimer of an implied warranty of merchantability and of the obligations
arising therefrom is so inimical to the public good as to compel an ad-
judication of its invalidity.'l
103 Id. at 367, 161 A.2d at 74.
104 Id. at 391, 161 A.2d at 87.
10 51d. at 403-04, 161 A.2d at 94-5.
106 Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
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Conjectural analysis of the precise rationale of the Henningsen case could
be endless. Certainly under the facts of the case the court concluded that
the assent of the buyers of the auto to the terms of the contract was only
apparent and not genuine and knowledgeable. This decision was rend-
ered without the benefit of an enabling statute such as section 2-302 of
the Uniform Commercial Code which grants a court the authority to hold
that a contract is unenforceable because it is unconscionable.
The concept of public policy does not admit of exactitude of defini-
tion. However, in 1916 a judge with substantial courage attempted the
following definition of public policy:
In substance it may be said to be the community common sense and com-
mon conscience, extended and applied throughout the state to matters of
public morals, public health, public safety, public welfare and the like. It
is that general and well-settled public opinion relating to man's plain, pal-
pable duty to his fellowmen, having due regard to all the circumstances of
each particular relation and situation10 7
The omnipresent "public policy" was relied upon in American States
Insurance Co. v. Hannan Construction Co.'08 to invalidate an exculpatory
clause in a commercial lease. In this case the court held that a depart-
ment store was not constructed in conformity with the Building Code re-
quirements of Ohio and accordingly the court refused to enforce an ex-
culpatory clause in favor of a lessor because to do so would thwart the
public policy of Ohio as reflected in its Building Code.' 0
Five years after the Henningsen case, the doctrines of unconscionabil-
ity and disparity of bargaining power were relied upon in another famous
common law case, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company"l0
where the court relying upon Henningsen and other cases refused to en-
force a contract because of its unconscionable qualities. In so doing the
court noted that "[I1n other jurisdictions, it has been held as a matter of
common law that unconscionable contracts are not enforceable.""' The
seller in this case operated a retail furniture store in the District of Colum-
bia and sold various household items on the installment plan. The printed
form used by the seller included what is commonly known as an "add-on"
provision. The court characterized this add-on provision as follows:
The effect of this rather obscure provision was to keep a balance due on
every item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever pur-
chased, was liquidated. As a result, the debt incurred at the time of pur-
chase of each item was secured by the right to repossess all the items pre-
viously purchased by the same purchaser, and each new item purchased
107 Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. I.. Ry. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St 64, 68, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (1916).
108 283 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ohio 1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1968).
109 Id. at 1007.
110 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
"ll Id. at 448.
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automatically became subject to a security interest arising out of the pre-
vious dealings."r2
The buyer, Mrs. Williams, purchased a stereo set in 1962 at a stated
value of $514.95. She defaulted in her payments and the seller sought
to replevy all items she had purchased over a period of years pursuant to
the add-on clause. The buyer asserted that the contract was unconscion-
able. The trial court held for the seller, and the intermediate court af-
firmed, although such court strongly condemned the seller's conduct and
expressed the wish that an appropriate statute were in effect so as to be
helpful to the court in granting appropriate relief to the buyer. However,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did not
feel stultified by the absence of a statute. The court observed initially
that ". .. the notion that an unconscionable bargain should not be given
full enforcement is by no means novel."' 13  The court then set forth the
following quotation from Scott v. United States: 14
If a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud,
a court of law will give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not
according to its letter, but only such as he is equitably entitled to.115
In its exploration of the meaning of the term unconscionability, the
court relied heavily on the Henningsen case. With respect to uncon-
scionability the court stated:
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Whether a
meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by
consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In
many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequal-
ity of bargaining power."16
The court then gave direct analysis to whether the assent of the buyer
was apparent or genuine by stating:
The manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this
consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious
education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the
terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of
fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices? Ordinarily, one
who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be
held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain. But
when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice,
signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of
112 Id. at 447.
113 Id. at 448.
114 79 U.S. 443, (1830).
1", Id. at 445, 350 F.2d at 448.
116 350 F.2d at 449.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifes-
tation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the
usual rule that the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should
be abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the con-
tract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld."17
Because the trial court and the appellate court in the Williams case
concluded that enforcement of the contract could not be refused no find-
ings were made on the possible unconscionability of the contract. Hence,
the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings since it was felt that the record was not sufficient for the court
to decide the issue as a matter of law.
The Uniform Commercial Code was enacted by Congress for the Dis-
trict of Columbia subsequent to the contracts involved in this case, and
hence the court did not base its decision on section 2-302 of the Code
which specifically provides that the court may refuse to enforce a contract
which it finds to be unconscionable at the time it was made. However,
in referring to section 2-302 of the Code, the court indicated that it felt
the pre-Code law on unconscionability was virtually the same as this sec-
tion.
While the Henningsen case has commanded much judicial attention,
it has not completely mesmerized all courts. In Marshall v. Murray
Oldsmobile Co., Inc.,"8 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in a
factual situation involving the same disclaimer of warranty as was found in
the Henningsen case, reaffirmed the traditional concept that the court can-
not make a new contract for the parties." 9  In this 1967 case, the court
considered an action by a buyer of an automobile against the seller. The
buyer of the automobile contended that the automobile was inoperable
and worthless because of the defective conditions therein. The defendant
automobile dealer contended that it had furnished the buyer with a new
car warranty in writing and asserted that it had fulfilled its obligations
under that warranty. The seller further alleged that the written warranty
given the buyer provided that there were no warranties expressed or
implied other than the new car warranty and that the written warranty
was " '. . in lieu of all other warranties, expressed or implied and all obli-
gations or liabilities on Dealer's part.' ",2
The court held that the provisions of the expressed new car warranty
did exclude the existence of an implied warranty of fitness of the automo-
bile sold to the plaintiff-buyer. The court then considered the buyer's
contention that the exclusionary provisions of the express warranty should
"17 Id. at 449-50.
118207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967).
"19 Id. at 976, 154 S.E.2d at 144.
120 Id. at 973, 154 S.E.2d at 143.
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be held invalid for '". .. overriding reasons of public policy.' "" In
making this argument the buyer relied dearly on the Henningsen case
wherein the Supreme Court of New Jersey held similar exclusionary lan-
guage to be invalid as inimical to the public good. With reference to the
Henningsen case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia stated: Though
the reason therefore is somewhat obscure, the court apparently felt that the
disclaimer clause was 'inimical to the public good'.... 2  The Virginia
Court then referred to that part of the Henningsen case wherein the
Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that the gross inequality of bargain-
ing position occupied by the consumer in the automobile industry is ap-
parent. In commenting further on Henningsen, the Virginia court con-
cluded:
A reading of the Henningsen case and a tracing of its questionable ac-
ceptance in other jurisdictions since it was decided in 1960 fail to convince
us of the efficacy of following the action of the New Jersey court. We
are loathe to make such abrupt changes in settled law and reluctant to
declare invalid the formal undertalings of parties for such vague reasons
of public policy.ms
The Virginia court refused to hold invalid the exclusionary language of
the express warranty offering two reasons: 1) previous decisions of the
court had given approval to mutual agreement by parties to determine
and fix the only warranty by which they are to be bound in the sale of
automobiles, 2) the court further concluded that if there exists the "over-
riding reasons of public policy" as claimed by the buyer and as relied upon
by the New Jersey court in Henningsen, such reasons would surely have
been apparent to the Virginia legislature when in 1964 it adopted the Uni-
form Commercial Code effective January 1, 1966. In this respect, the
court note&, that the Virginia legislature while providing in the Code that
there should be an implied warranty of fitness attached to the sale of
goods, the legislature specifically provided in another section how such an
implied warranty may be excluded.12'
The instant case arose before the effective date of the Code in Virginia,
aiid hence the court was concerned with only common law doctrines.
But the court emphasized that it was persuaded to reject the argument of
unconscionability by the buyer because the legislature in adopting the
Uniform Commercial Code in 1964 did not recognize the existence of
public policy reasons sufficient to require it to say that there shall be no
exclusion of implied warranties of fitness in the sale of personal property.
In concluding that the exclusionary provision of the express warranty
by the seller was valid, the court emphasized that no fraud, mistake or
121Id. at 975, 154 S.E2d at 143.
122id. at 977, 154 S.E.2d at 144.
a Id.
124 Id. at 978, 154 SE.2d at 145-46; see UNIFORm CommmcIAL CODE §§ 2-315, 2-316.
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disability was alleged by the buyer. The rationale of this conclusion of
the court was set forth in the opinion as follows:
So too, here, the defendant's express warranty, in language which admits
of no uncertainty or ambiguity, excluded the existence of any implied
warranty of fitness. No greater inconsistency could be conceived than to
imply a warranty of fitness where the dear language of an express war-
ranty says that none shall exist. To ignore that inconsistency and imply a
warranty of fitness would be to make a new contract for the parties. That
the court can not and will not do.12 5
The courts have not often attempted to define with specificity the term
"unconscionability" or "unconscionable contract." In an early English case
it was held that an unconscionable bargain is one
Such as no man in his senses and-not under delusion would make on the
one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other. 126
This definition was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in an
early case.12 This same definition of unconscionability was relied upon
in a 1931 Indiana lower court decision1s where the court refused to en-
force the action of a bank president to recover on a contract whereby a
merchant, ostensibly for the president's services in procuring a loan from
the bank, promised to pay the president $100 monthly. The court con-
cluded that the contract was unconscionable and would not be judicially
enforced.
In the leading cases, however, where the courts have refused to en-
force a contract because of its unconscionability, they have deemed it
imprudent or unnecessary to define the term. An earlier but somewhat
classic case illustrating that equity will not enforce an unconscionable bar-
gain was Campbell Soup Company v. Wlentz'29 where the-court denied
the plaintiff's soup company specific performance of a conta&-for the sale
to it of all of a particular type of carrot grown on the defendant's farm
during the 1947 season. The court initially concluded relative to the
adequacy of the legal remedy that in this factual situation the case was
a proper one for equitable relief. However, the court refused to grant
specific performance.
We think it is too hard a bargain and too one-sided an agreement to en-
title the plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience. For each individual
grower the agreement is made by filling in names and quantity and price
on a printed form furnished by the buyer. This form has quite obviously
been drawn by skillful draftsman with the buyer's interests in mind. 30
125 207 Va. at 976, 154 S.E.2d at 144.
126 Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750). A similar definition
was given in Martin v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 224 Ga. 550, 163 5.E.2d 885 (1968).
12 7 Hune v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889).
128 tiefler v. McCullough, 97 Ind. App. 123, 174 N.E. 823 (1931).
129 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948).
ISO Id. at 83.
[VOL 31
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
The court then referred to provisions of the contract which it deemed
harsh. One paragraph provided that the carrots were to have their stalks
cut off and be in dean sanitary bags or other containers approved by
Campbell. The paragraph concluded with the statement that Campbell's
determination of conformance with such specifications shall be conclusive.
The provision of the contract however, upon which the court focused its
attention, and which led the court to conclude that the contract was un-
conscionable, was a provision that excused Campbell from accepting car-
rots which it could not use because of certain circumstances such as labor
disturbances, work stoppage or strikes involving Campbell's employees.
But even under such circumstances, the grower, while he could not hold
Campbell liable for failure to take the carrots, was not permitted to sell
them elsewhere unless Campbell agreed. In refusing to authorize specific
performance of the contract, the court concluded:
As already said, we do not suggest that this contract is illegal. All we
say is that the sum total of its provisions drives too hard a bargain for a
court of conscience to assist.' 31
The essence of the court's rationale was that the agreement was too one-
sided and was lacking in contractual reciprocity. In short, Campbell had
driven too hard a bargain.
Just three years later, a Campbell contract was again before a court 32
and again farmer-defendants contended that the contract was unfair and
therefor unenforceable in equity relying on the previous Campbell case.
The federal district court noted that in the previous Campbell case, the
contract provision considered the most harsh was that one which excused
Campbell from accepting carrots under specified circumstances but which
prohibited the farmers even under such circumstances from selling the
carrots elsewhere unless Campbell consented thereto. The court noted
that the objectionable provision in the Campbell contract in the first case
had been eliminated and that Campbell had revised the grower's contract
and balanced its terms. In this later case specific performance was granted
with the observation that
All of the provisions of the contracts herein are mutual and benefit the
farmers and the Company equally. For example, the provision relating to
contingencies exonerates both the growers and Campbell of default or de-
lay in certain circumstances. 133
The first Campbell case referred to is of special significance since the
comments to the unconscionability clause of section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code state that the principle involved in that statute is
131 Id. at 84.
132 Campbell Soup Co. v. Diehm, 111 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
133 Id. at 215.
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... one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise (Cf. Camp-
bell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 3d Cir. 1948) and not of dis-
turbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.... 3 4
There is of course no dearth of authority in which specific perform-
ance of a contract has been denied because the contract terms were
deemed to be unconscionable, oppressive or unfair. The Campbell case
is often cited as the classic illustration of this principle. As only another
example of the doctrine, reference is made to a 1955 decision 35 by the
Supreme Court of Missouri where in specific performance of a contract
for sale of a house worth $11,000 to $12,000 for $2,400 was deemed so
inadequate by the court as to make the contract and its enforcement op-
pressive and unfair, and hence specific performance was denied to the
buyer.
The United States Supreme Court, in Bisso v. Inland Waterways Cor-
poration,l3 took judicial cognizance of the disparity of bargaining power
in holding that a towboat owner could not validly contract against all
liability for his own negligent towage. This conclusion which the Court
based on public policy was also needed ". . . to protect those in need of
goods or services from being overreached by others who have power to
drive hard bargains." '3r
V. LACK OF MEANINGFUL ASSENT CASES
Reference will now be made to some selected cases wherein the courts
have focused attention on the circumstances under which a contract was
entered into in concluding that a contract or a portion thereof should not
be enforced because one party to the contract did not meaningfully assent
thereto.
A series of decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have indi-
cated that the physical placement of a contract provision is of legal signif-
icance to courts. In a 1953 decision, Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw,3 8 a home-
owner signed a builder's contract form calling for extensive work and
repair to be done on the homeowner's premises. The homeowner became
dissatisfied with the repair work and ordered the plaintiff's (contractor's)
employees off the job. The plaintiff-contractor confessed judgment against
the homeowner pursuant to an alleged warrant of attorney clause contained
in the printed form contracts signed by the defendant-homeowner. The
contract consisted of five form sheets carrying certain printed matter, such
as specifications of work to be done and materials to be supplied. The
334 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
135 Miller v. Coffeen, 365 Mo. 204,280 S.W.2d 100 (1955).
136 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
137 Id. at 91. See also Weaevr v. American Oil Company, 261 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. App. 1970).
138 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953).
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face side of the contract referred to "conditions" on the reverse side among
which was buried the supposed authority for a warrant of attorney. In
this situation the court refused to enforce the alleged warrant of attorney
and confession of judgment clause, saying that under this factual pattern it
... can hardly be accepted in a court of law as an acknowledgement of a
confession of judgement. While th6 word 'condition' may conceivably
embrace almost any circumstance, upon which, or, because of which, a
right is created or a liability attaches, it cannot be used to mean surrender
of fundamental personal and property absolutes unless the word appears
within a setting which warns of the potency of the capitulation being
made.'39
The opinion of the court emphasizes that a person in the position of the
plaintiff-homeowner would not have expected to find the confession of
judgment clause in the document which he signed. Contrary to the tra-
ditional rule that one is bound by what one signs, the court concluded
that the confession of judgment clause was here inapplicable and unen-
forceable and stated:
... [W]hen a party to a contract seeks to bind the other party with the
unyielding thongs of a warranty of attorney-confession of judgement, a
device not ordinarily expected by a homeowner in a simple agreement for
alterations and repairs, the inclusion of such a self-abnegating provision
must appear in the body of the contract and cannot be incorporated by
a casual reference with a designation not of its own.34o (Emphasis sup-
plied)
In a 1956 decision" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed and
further explained the position taken with reference to the confession of
judgment clause in Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw.42 In the 1956 decision there
was involved an equipment rental agreement which contained on its face
side the provision that "this Contract and all Terms and Conditions, rights
and remedies herein contained and set forth on the reverse side hereof
shall bind the parties hereto. . . ,, 43 The reverse side of the agreement
contained twenty-one paragraphs of fine print, one of which contained the
warrant to confess judgment. The court held the confession of judg-
ment clause inapplicable and unenforceable. The rationale of the court's
decision was set forth as follows:
A general reference in the body of an executed lease to terms and con-
ditions to be found outside the agreement is insufficient to bind the lessee
to a warrant of attorney not contained in the body of the lease unless the
lessee signs the warrant where it does appear. In short, a warrant of at-
13D Id. at 4, 97 A.2d at 236.
140 Id. at 8, 97 A.2d at 238.
141 Franz Tractor Co., Inc. v. Wyoming Valley Nursery, 384 Pa. 213, 120 A.2d 303 (1956).
142 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953).
143 384 Pa. 213, 214, 120 A.2d 303, 304.
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torney to confess judgment is not to be foisted upon anyone by implica-
tion or by general and nonspecific reference.144
In the 1962 decision of L. B. Foster Co. v. Tri-W Construction Co.,
Inc.,'45 the court sought to further clarify its position on the confession of
judgment clauses. In this case rental agreements contained confession of
judgment provisions set out on the reverse sides of such agreements. The
face sides of the agreements did not indicate inclusion of any warrants
and the signatures of the parties appeared only on the face sides. The
face sides of the contract did, however, contain references to "terms and
conditions" which included the confession of judgment clauses on the
reverse side of the agreements. The court held that judgments based upon
the confessions or warrants of attorney provisions on the reverse side of
the agreements to be invalid. The case dearly seems to hold that the
confession of judgment clauses are invalid and unenforceable unless they
appear on the same side of the document as do the signature of the person
to be bound by such confession of judgment provisions.
VI. TICKET CASES
In an infinite variety of cases the courts have held that the various
types of alleged contracts such as baggage checks, checks issued at parking
lots and amusement device tickets did not purport to be contracts and that
accordingly some provision of limitation therein is not operative unless
such clause is specifically brought to the attention of the recipient. In the
well-known case of Klar v. H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc.,46 the plaintiff
checked a parcel consisting of valuable fur skins with the defendant-bailee
who operated a parcel room at a railroad station. When the plaintiff pre-
sented the parcel check and demanded the package, he was informed by
the defendant that by mistake the parcel had been delivered to another
person who had presented a receipt bearing another number. The parcel
check accepted by the plaintiff was made of cardboard three inches in
length and two and one half inches in width. There appeared on the
check in red letters one quarter inch high the word contract and the fol-
lowing language:
This CONTRACT is made on the following conditions and in consideration
of the low rate at which the service is performed, and its acceptance by the
depositor, expressly binds both parties to the CONTRACT.
Charge-10 cents for every 24 hours or fraction thereof, for each piece
covered by this contract.
Loss or damage-no claim shall be made in excess of $25 for loss or dam-
age to any piece. 147
144Id. at 216, 120 A.2d at 305.
145 409 Pa. 318, 186 A.2d 18.
146 270 App. Div. 538, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285, aff'd 296 N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947).
147 270 App. Div. at 540, 61 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
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It was held that the plaintiff was not limited in his recovery to the $25
limitation specified on the claim check. The gist of the court's decision
is reflected in the following statement:
The law in this State is well grounded that to bind the bailor to a con-
tract limiting the bailee's liability, it must be established that there is a
special contract to that effect; that the bailor has had reasonable notice of
the terms and that he has assented to them.' 48
The court's reasoning was that a reasonable man in the position of the
plaintiff-bailor would not usually notice the fine print on a parcel check
but would rather consider the check not as a contract but as a means of
identification only. At another point in the opinion the court said:
There is no proof in this record that there were conspicuous signs or large
placards about the parcel room calling attention to the limitation of lia-
bility, nor is there evidence that plaintiffs had any other form of notice
which embraced the terms of a special contract or that there was any op-
portunity afforded to plaintiffs to assent to or dissent from the alleged
contract. In the absence of any of these items of proof, it cannot be said
that a mere acceptance of the parcel check by the bailor with the printed
matter thereon, as a matter of law, sufficiently brought to plaintiff's at-
tention the limitation of liability.' 49
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in a 1956 decision,
Polonsky v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Association,' emphasized
that differing rules are applied by the courts to a document that purports
or appears on its face to be a contract as contrasted with documents not
purporting to be contracts such as the claim check in the Klar case. In
the Polonsky case the court held that a husband and wife who were de-
positors in a savings and loan association could not recover from money
which had been withdrawn from their account by an imposter on the
basis of forged withdrawal slips. The defendant-association successfully
urged as a defense the following provision which was printed on the in-
side of the bank book: "This association shall not be held responsible for
money paid out to any person unlawfully presenting this book."'' The
court noted that there was no evidence that any of the printed matter
contained in the bank book ever came to the attention or was brought to
the attention of the depositors. It held that the depositors could not
recover because the passbook on its face purported to set forth terms of
a contract and that the depositors had assented to the terms thereof by
accepting it, and they were bound thereby whether they had or had not
read its contents. Thus, the court announced the traditional rule that a
party to a contract is bound by what he signs or assents to, in the absence of
148 Id. at 541, 61 N.Y.S.2d at 288.
149 Id. at 542, 61 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
160 334 Afass. 697, 138 N.E.2d 115 (1956).
151Id. at 698, 138 N.E.2d at 116.
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fraud. However, in the course of its opinion the court made the follow-
ing observation applicable to the claim check cases when it stated:
Where what is given to a person purports on its face to set forth the
terms of a contract, the person, whether he reads it or not, by accepting
it assents to its terms, and is bound by any limitation of liability therein
contained, in the absence of fraud.... On the other hand, where what is
received does not purport to be a contract, such as, for example, a baggage
check, a check issued at a parking lot, or a ticket to an amusement device,
it has been held that the person receiving it is not bound by a limitation of
liability unless it is actually known to the recipient.152
The doctrine of the Klar case is also exemplified in various cases when
the owner of an automobile has left such auto at a parking lot for parking
and safe keeping, has paid a fee and has been issued a claim check by the
bailor-operator of the lot. In the 1950 case of McAshan v. Cavitt, 53 the
Supreme Court of Texas ruled, in an action by a car owner to recover
damages for the loss of an automobile stolen from the defendant's parking
lot, that since the owner did not know of the limitations expressed on a
parking lot sign and claim check and was not informed that the lot would
close at a certain time, the contract of limitation did not include those
limitations. The court emphasized that the sign indicating that the lot
would dose at 6:00 p.m. would be strictly construed against the user
thereof and furthermore that the sign had not been seen by the plaintiff
and was not called to her attention. The plaintiff did not read the limita-
tions printed thereon and her attention was not directed to the limitations
printed thereon. The Ohio Supreme Court has similarly held "4 that
printed conditions on a receipt issued by the operator of a parking lot
were not part of the contract of bailment in the absence of anything to
indicate that the bailor-car owner either expressly or impliedly assented
to such printed conditions prior to or contemporaneously with delivery
of the property to the bailee.
The doctrine of the baggage check claims illustrated by the famous
Klar case and others referred to were commented upon at length in the
Henningsen case. In its summary the court in the Henningsen case cate-
gorized a number of cited court decisions as follows: (1) Clauses on bag-
gage checks restricting the liability of common carriers for loss or damage
are not enforceable unless the limitation is fairly and honestly negotiated
and understandingly entered into. (2) The same doctrine applies to
limitations on parcel check room tickets citing the Klar case and many
others. (3) The same doctrine is applicable to automobile parking lot,
152 Id. at 701, 138 N.E.2d at 117.
'53 149 Tex. 147, 229 S.W.2d 1016 (1950).
3 
54 Agricultural Insurance Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N.X.2d 658 (1944).
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garage tickets or claim checks, citing various cases including the pre-
viously referred to Constantine case decided by the Ohio Supreme Court. 5
That the manner and circumstance in which a contract is consummated
affects judicial enforcement of such contracts is evidenced by two deci-
sions in which beneficiaries were permitted to recover for airline trip in-
surance policies which policies purported to limit coverage to scheduled
airlines. 150 In both of these decisions the airline trip insurance was pur-
chased by the deceased from an automatic vending machine at the airport.
In both cases the insurance company claimed as a defense that the death
of the insured resulted while he was a passenger on a non-regularly sched-
uled airline. However the Court of Appeals of New York and the Su-
preme Court of California permitted the beneficiary of the insurance con-
tract to recover. In concluding that the beneficiary of the airline insurance
policy could recover, the New York Court of Appeals noted that signs
and placards at the airport indicated that the policy covered flights on
"scheduled" airlines. However, the court held that the limitation in the
policy relative to application only to "scheduled" airlines was inapplicable
and inoperative. The court in its opinion stated:
We all know that a contract of insurance, drawn by the insurer, must be
read through the eyes of the average man on the street or the average
housewife who purchases it. Neither of them is expected to carry the
Civil Aeronautics Act or the Code of Federal Regulations when taking a
plane.'57
With reference to the sale of the insurance policy by vending machines
as bearing on the lack of meaningful mutual assent the court stated:
It may save money to have a number of machines instead of a salesman.
It may be wise because people hurrying to planes will not wait on a line to
buy insurance. However, there must be a meeting of minds achieved be-
tween the applicant and the company through an application and signs
and lettering, for while the applicant has a mind the machine has none
and can not answer questions. If the defendant had paid for a living
salesman, the decedent would not have purchased the insurance if it did
not cover her trip or she might have purchased it and changed her
plane.158
In the 1963 decision of the California Supreme Court, the court per-
mitted recovery by the beneficiary of the airline insurance policy where
the insured was killed while a passenger on a non-scheduled airline despite
the specific provision in the policy which provided that the policy did not
cover other than scheduled air carriers. The court emphasized the special
'55 32 N.J. at 396-97, 161 A.2d at 90-91.
150 Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954);
Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377 P.2d 284 (1962).
157 306 N.Y. at 364, 118 N.E.2d at 558.
1581d. at 366, 118 N.X.2d at 559.
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circumstances of the case in that the insurance policy was purchased from
a vending machine amidst the hurry-scurry of an airline terminal and
concluded that coverage limitations of the policy should be plainly and
dearly brought to the attention of insurance purchasers.
In its opinion the California Supreme Court referred to the famous
Henningsen decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The instant contract presents an even stronger case than Henningsen for
the requirement that the exclusionary clause of the contraact should not
be enforced in the absence of plain and clear notification to the public.
The disparity in bargaining power between the insurer and the insurer
here is so tremendous that the insured had adopted a means of selling
policies which makes bargaining totally impossible. The purchaser lacks
any opportunity to clarify ambiguous terms or to discover inconspicuous or
concealed ones. He must purchase the policy before he even knows its
provisions.159
In concluding its opinion, the California Supreme Court directed the
trial court to enter judgment for the plaintiff who was the beneficiary of
the policy and stated:
The exclusionary dause of that contract, upon which the insurance com-
pany relies, is an unexpected one. Its application in some circumstances
would be unconscionable. It is placed in an inconspicuous position of the
document.100 (Emphasis supplied.)
VII. THE UNCONSCIONABILITY CLAUSE OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-Is IT A SOLUTION FOR
UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS?
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code in specific and direct
language grants authority to a court to refuse enforcement of a contract
upon the court's finding that the contract or any clause thereof was un-
conscionable at the time such contract was made. In a forthright and
singularly unique way the Code grants what appears to be unbridled dis-
cretion to a court to refuse to enforce a contract because the court concludes
that the contract is unconscionable at the time the same was entered into.
Based upon the bare language of the statute, it could be conduded that
it is merely a codification or restatement of the common law doctrine of
unconscionability as characterized by such candid decisions in the Hen-
ningsen case and the Walker furniture case. In the alternative, the stat-
ute might be viewed as a carte blanche authority to the judiciary to emascu-
late the entire stability of contracts. Based upon the surprisingly few
cases that have been decided under this statute, it is the writer's belief that
it has received temperate and enlightened use by the courts. Section
2-302 of the Code reads as follows:




If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination. 6 1
From a reading of the statute it is apparent that seemingly unlimited
authority is granted to a court to refuse the enforcement of contract under
any circumstances the court deems to constitute the requisite unconscion-
ability. The clause has been both praised and criticized.' Much of the
criticism is directed to the failure of the statute to set standards to guide
the court for determining what is or is not unconscionable and for the
broad authority given the court to remake a contract. The quoted statute
does not define the term "unconscionable" nor are the various factors or
criteria of unconscionability enumerated. The problems presented in an
application of the unconscionable clause of the Code would seem to place
the court in a totally isolated area of discretion which would seem to pre-
sent more vexatious problems than in those areas where the courts have
held exculpatory clauses invalid as being contrary to public policy where
the court found the indicated public policy in a statute.163
The following comments of the draftsman of section 2-302 indicate its
basic purpose:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police ex-
plicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscion-
able. In the past such policing has been accomplished by adverse con-
struction of languauge, by manipulation of the rules of offer and accept-
ance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to
the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is intended to allow
the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or par-
ticular clause therein and to make a conclusion of law as to its uncon-
scionability. The basic test is whether, in the light of the general com-
mercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under
the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract....
The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise
(Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 3d Cir. 1948) and not
161 UNIFOrE CoMM]zacIAL CODE § 2-302.
102 Beaver, The Uniform Commercial Code's Solution; For Unconscionable Contracts, 48
OR. L. REv. 209, 210 n.6 (1969).
103 TunkI v. Regents of University of California, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).
The court held invalid a release from liability for future negligence imposed as a condition
of admission to a charitable hospital. It was concluded that a California statute invalidated
the hospital's attempt to exempt itself from negligence.
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of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power.164
Before reviewing some of the surprisingly few cases decided under
the unconscionable clause, it seems appropriate to explore whether the
courts will confine the application of section 2-302 to sales contracts fall-
ing under article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In 1968 the Su-
preme Court of New Mexico" 5 held that section 2-302 of the Code is
limited in its application to sales and does not apply to security transac-
tions. However, in Unico06 the New Jersey Supreme Court relied upon
section 2-302 in refusing to enforce a "waiver of defenses" clause in an
action by the buyer of a note against the maker thereof which litigation
involved non-sales areas of the Code such as article 3 and section 9-206.
In State Bank of Albany v. Hickey0 7 a lower court in New York consid-
ered but refused to apply section 2-302 to the financing arrangements that
governed the discounting of chattel paper between an automobile dealer
and his bank.
It would seem inadvisable on the basis of the few decided cases to
conclude that section 2-302 will be judicially confined to sales of goods"",
under article 2 of the Code.
A 1968 decision of a New Jersey lower court, Zabriskie Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Smith," 9 indicates that the unconscionability provision of section
2-302 may be applied alternatively by the court even though the court
also concluded that a specific contract clause involving a disclaimer of war-
ranties did not conform to the specific requirement of section 2-316(2) of
the Code that language for the exclusion or modification of implied war-
ranties of merchantability or fitness must be conspicuous. In the court
action, whereby an automobile dealer sued the buyer of a new automobile
for the balance of the purchase price and incidental charges, the court
held that the paragraph in fine print on the back of the automobile sales
contract to the effect that there were no warranties on the motor vehicle
sold by the dealer except new vehicle warranty was not "conspicuous"
10 4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
10 5 Hernandez v. S.I.C. Finance Co., 79 N.M. 673,448 P.2d 474 (1968).
A United States District Court in 1967 also ruled that securiy transactions are beyond the
scope of section 2-302 which permits a court to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract.
The court held valid a secured creditor's claim against a bankrupt based on a transaction
whereby bankrupt had obligated itself to repay $26,000 over a three year period, with six
percent interest, for net loan of $19,267. In re Advance Printing and Litho Co., 277 F. Supp.
101 (E.D. Pa.), aJJ'd, 387 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1967).
10 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
107 29 App. Div. 2d 993, 288 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1968). In Robinson v.
Jefferson Credit Corp., 4 UCC Rep. Service 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), the court applied section
2-302 in a situation involving the repossession of an auto even though there is no unconscion-
ability clause in article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
1 68 UNIFORM COMMERCiAL CODE § 2-105.
109 99 N.J. Super. 441,240 A.2d 195 (1968).
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within the meaning of section 2-316, Uniform Commercial Code and
therefore did not exclude implied warranties of merchantability of fitness.
Interestingly, however, the court saw fit to extend its opinion by pointing
out that attempts at limitation and disclaimer of the type herein involved
were severely criticized in the Henningsen case. The court concluded thatl
the "public policy" concept of Henningsen finds statutory support in
sections 2-316 and 2-302 of the Code. 7'
The same New Jersey court in another 1968 opinion'7 ' held that a con-
tract for the sale of the freezer was unenforceable because it was procured
by a fraud and because the price was "unconscionable" under section 2-302
of the Code. The court interpretated the evidence as indicating fraudu-
lent misrepresentation by the seller. However, the court also specifically
found that the contract was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable
under section 2-302. With respect to this aspect of its decision, the court
concluded:
The conscience of this court is shocked by the price imposed upon these
defendants for the freezer. The testimony in court valued the freezer at
no more than $300.00. The price charged was in excess of 2/2 times the
maximum value. The time-price differential alone almost equalled the
value of the freezer. In light of these facts, this court is constrained to
hold the price in this contract unconscionable.
It is therefore the opinion of this court that the contract is unenforce-
able because it was procured by fraud and is unconscionable l7a
One of the difficulties presented by the relatively few cases decided to
date under the unconscionability clause is that the courts have raised un-
conscionability only as an alternative ground of decision, and therefore,
the courts have not given extended analysis to what constitutes the un-
conscionable requisite of the Code. The New Hampshire Supreme Court73
in 1964, as an alternative basis for its decision, found a contract to be un-
conscionable under section 2-302. However, the court's first predicate of
decision was that the contract was voided because of a failure to comply
with an interest disclosure statute and hence the court did not give a de-
tailed analytical disclosure of its rationale of unconscionability. The con-
tract involved repair work on the defendant's property. The cost was to
be $1,759.00, but the defendants in applying for financing signed an ap-
plication containing a blank note and a blank power of attorney. While
the application stated the total amount due, the number of monthly pay-
ments and the amount of each monthly payment, it did not state the rate
of interest as required by the state's disclosure statute. The defendants
were notified a few days later of the approval of their application for
170 Id. at 448, 240 A.2d at 199.
171 Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500,247 A.2d 701 (1968).
1721d. at 504, 247 A.2d at 703.
173 American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Macver, 105 NI. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
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financing which stated that the appliction for credit in the net amount of
$1,759.00 had been approved and that the monthly payments would be
$42.81 for sixty months "'including principal, interest and life and dis-
ability insurance.' ,T4 The defendant then notified the plaintiff to
cease work on the premises, and the plaintiff brought an action for dam-
ages. In addition to holding the contract void for failure to comply with
the state's disclosure statute, the court held that recovery could not be had
by the plaintiff because the contract was unconscionable under section
2-302. In this regard the court stated:
Inasmuch as the defendants have received little or nothing of value and
under the transaction they entered into they were paying $1,609 for goods
and services valued at far less, the contract should not be enforced because
of its unconscionable features. This is not a new thought or a new rule
in this jurisdiction .... (citation omitted) 'It has long been the law in
this state that contracts may be declared void because unconscionable and
oppressive .... ,'76
It was the court's conclusion that there was a gross disparity in the rela-
tive values exchanged by the parties to the contract.
In purporting to follow the unconscionability holding of the above
case, several lower courts in their decisions have made the finding of
unconscionability primarily dependent upon price disparity. Thus, in a
New York case it was held that a retail installment contract wherein prices
charged varied from two to six times the cost per unit to sellers were un-
conscionable and hence unenforceable under section 2-302 of the Code.17 3
In other recent lower court decisions in New York price disparity has been
equated to unconscionability under the Code. In Jones v. Star Credit
Corp.,177 an action was brought by the buyers who were welfare recipients
to reform a sales contract which they contended was unconscionable. The
court held that selling for $900.00 ($1,439.69 including credit charges
and $18.00 sales tax) a freezer unit having an actual retail value of $300.00
was unconscionable as a matter of law under the section 2-302 of the
Code. The flavor of the court's opinion is indicated in the following
passages from the decision:
On the one hand it is necessary to recognize the importance of preserving
the integrity of agreements and the fundamental right of parties to deal,
trade, bargain, and contract. On the other hand there is the concern for
the uneducated and often illiterate individual who is the victim of gross
inequality of bargaining power, usually the poorest members of the com-
munity. 78
1741d. at 436, 201 A.2d at 887.
175Id. at 439, 201 A.2d at 889.
176 State ex rel Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
177 59 Msc. 2d 189,298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
178 Id. at 190, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
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It is interesting to note that in reaching its conclusion that the contract
was unconscionable the court refers not only to American Home Improve-
ment, Inc. v. Maclver, 7 0 which was decided under the unconscionable pro-
vision of section 2-302 of the Code but also cites Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Company.80 In referring to this latter case the court
said: "... . the meaningfulness of choice essential to the making of a con-
tract, can be negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power."''
In a 1967 lower court decision in the State of New York,"8 2 it was
held that excessively high prices may constitute an unconscionable con-
tract under section 2-302 of the Code. The court then held that the
defendants, buyers of an automobile, were entitled to reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to the commercial setting of a contract of
sale to aid the court in determining whether the contract was uncon-
scionable as a matter of law. Accordingly, it was further held that the as-
signee of the contract was not entitled to have granted its motion for
summary judgment in an action on the contract.
Another case which supports the judicial view that excessive price
alone may constitute sufficient basis to find that a contract is unconscio-
nable is Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso.'3 The sale involved a refrigerator-
freezer which would have sold for a cash price of $900 but added carrying
charges of $246 made the total purchase price $1145.00. The seller ad-
mitted that the appliance had cost him only $348.00. When the buyer de-
faulted but maintained possession of the appliance, the seller sought dam-
agers for breach of the contract. The trial court held the contract was
unconscionable under section 2-302 and limited the seller's recovery to
his wholesale price. The decision was reversed as to the remedy, but the
appellate court concluded that the evidence supported the finding that
the contract was unconscionable. However, the seller was permitted to
recover its net cost, plus a reasonable profit in addition to trucking and
service charges and reasonable finance charges. In addition to the exces-
sive price, the evidence showed that the buyers were Spanish-speaking
persons who could not understand English. Since the sales contract was
written in English, the buyers had no ready way of reading or under-
standing the contract.
It would seem apparent that the relatively few decisions to date under
section 2-302 are in accord with the stated intention of the draftsman of
the Code and with common law application of the concept of uncon-
scionability.
179 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
180 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
18159 Misc. 2d at 192,298 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
182 Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civ. Ct. 1967).
183 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd as to remedy 54 Misc. 2d 119,
281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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The discussion of section 2-302 will be ended with a reference to two
decisions in which the court did not find the contract unconscionable. In
Sinkoff Beverage Co., Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.,""4 a contract be-
tween a brewer and a local distributor authorized the parties to terminate
the contract upon ten days notice. The agreement which was signed in
1960 provided that the contract could be terminated by either party with-
out cause or notice. In June 1966 the brewery served a ten day notice of
termination of the distributorship agreement. The local distributor con-
tended that the ten day notice of termination was unconscionable under
section 2-302 of the Code. This argument was rejected by the court be-
cause it was concluded that the contract was fair at the time it was made
which is when the unconscionability must exist under section 2-302.
In 1969 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,"8 5
was faced with the contention that a contract provision was unconscionable
and hence unenforceable under section 2-302 as embodied in the statutes of
the State of Illinois. The litigation involved the action against an airplane
producer and its distributor for damage allegedly resulting from the non-
delivery of an airplane to the plaintiff on the date specified in a contract
with the distributor. The court held that where the airplane producer was
constructing a new type of airplane and it was common to the industry to
not promise delivery date and to obtain release from liability in the
event of failure to deliver, a provision in producer's purchase order in
effect limiting producer's liability for non-delivery to refund of deposit
was not unconscionable. The court further held that when production
engines proved hazardous so that producer was unable to deliver, the
producer was not liable. With reference to the unconscionable clause,
section 2-302, the court concluded that such statute "... . makes dear that
the unconscionability of a clause is to be judged not in the abstract, but
rather in its commercial setting."'-" Here the producer-defendant was
constructing what was at least for itself a new type of airplane construc-
tion. The plane was to be turbine powered rather than piston powered.
The buyer-plaintiff was aware of this. The producer began by making a
prototype. This was successful but later effort with production engines
proved hazardous. The evidence showed that when the plaintiff bought
another plane from defendant's competitor, the plaintiff accepted the
same terms as it claims are unconscionable. Against this background the
court held section 2-302 inapplicable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Is freedom of contract still relevant? The case law answer is "yes it
is relevant and respected but not sacrosanct." It is still a basic tenent
184 51 Misc. 2d 446,273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
18 5 Dow Corning Corp. v. North American Rockwell Corp., 411 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969).
186 Id. at 626.
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of contract law that the parties to a contract may, absent statute, control
and establish their contractual rights and obligations unless a court refuses
to enforce such contract because it is deemed "unconscionable." Various
courts in pre-Code decisions have candidly characterized contracts or clauses
therein as being "unconscionable" and refused judicial enforcement
thereof.
It is submitted that in placing judicial restraint on freedom of con-
tract when the contract is drafted beyond the edge of minimal requisites
of fairness, the courts are fostering the preservation and not the emascula-
tion of contract law. It is believed that supine enforcement of all con-
tracts by the rote process of clinging to "freedom of contract" rubric will
foster disrespect and cynical suspicion by the populace concerning the
judicial process.
In viewing freedom of contract as not an illimitable concept, the
courts are getting to the core of contract law and are determining whether
there was, in reality, "mutual assent" by the contracting parties. Recur-
ringly, judicial inquiries in contract cases are:
What was the bargain of the parties in fact? Was there a meaningful
choice in establishing the contractual terms?
Did gross inequality of bargaining power negate meaningful mutual as-
sent?
In seeking to determine if there was "mutual assent" in fact, the courts
have indicated reflective awareness that "freedom of contract" relates to
and was judicially developed for negotiated transactions.
A review of the case law indicates no justifiable need for anxiety rela-
tive to possible judicial intemperance in qualifying the "freedom of con-
tract" concept when contracts are deemed to be unconscionable. The
courts have reflected enlightened concern for the delicate balance between
the unquestioned need to preserve integrity of agreements and the de-
sirability to require basic fairness in order that "mutual assent" is equated
to meaningful assent.
Legislatures in the enactment of section 2-302 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code have reposed confidence in the courts to exercise enlight-
ened restraint on freedom of contract by buttressing judicial courage with
legislative restatement of the common law concept that a court may re-
fuse to enforce an unconscionable contract.
Section 2-302 also reflects legislative disenchantment with the rigid
application of the freedom of contract doctrine in cases where mutual
assent in fact seemed to be absent and where the courts appeared more
concerned with the formality of the phrase "freedom of contract" than
with the realities of the contractual transaction.
There is no definitive indication in the case law that section 2-302
will produce judicial results substantially different than the common law
19701
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cases prior to the Code. The Code cases under section 2-302 have relied
heavily on the common law cases involving the judicial conclusion that a
contract was unconscionable.
That section 2-302 has focused attention upon the concept of uncon-
scionability and provoked some agonizing judicial assessment of the con-
tract as a negotiated transaction reflecting "mutual assent" is clearly re-
flected in the case law.
The decisions interpreting section 2-302 have given added emphasis
to price disparity. There is a discernible judicial trend to conclude that
sufficient disparity between value and price may by itself constitute the
requisite unconscionability for refusal to enforce a contract.
While there is conflict in the case law as to whether section 2-302
should be limited in scope to article 2 of the Code, it would seem that
the attention the statute has riveted on "unconscionability" will in the
future result in the expansion of the range of its application beyond sales
of goods.
The case law does not reveal that the courts have viewed section 2-302
as a spur to judicial creativity and improvisation in the law of contracts.
It is submitted that the relatively small body of case law under the Code
"unconscionable" provision has achieved the stated objective in the com-
ments of the Code drafters in that the courts are policing "explicitly
against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable."
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